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11 Introduction
Until recently, most formal political analyses of party competition have as-
sumed that both parties are Downsian [Downs (1957)]–that is, their objec-
tive is to maximize the probability of winning oﬃce. As an alternative, there
exists a growing body of literature concerning the competition between par-
tisan parties (those that have policy preferences)–see, e.g., Wittman (1973)
and Roemer (1997). Almost all of these analyses, however, have assumed that
the policy space is uni-dimensional. Moreover, it is well-known that neither
Downsian nor partisan party models can reliably produce a Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies) whenever, as discussed in Roemer (2001), the policy space
is multi-dimensional. Importantly, in many real political competition con-
texts, we may naturally assume more than a single policy issue, and need
to address the issue of non-existence. Given this, there are perhaps at least
t h r e ep o s s i b l ew a y sf o r w a r d :t h eﬁrst is to allow for mixed strategies, the
second is to change the game into a stage game and use some variant of a
subgame perfect equilibrium, and the third possibility is to adopt the Besley-
Coate-Osborne-Slivinski notion of citizen-candidate equilibrium [Besley and
Coate (1997); Osborne and Slivinski (1996)]. However, in the case of compet-
ing political parties, playing mixed strategies is diﬃcult to interpret, and it is
not always the case that a policy contest takes place as a stage game between
a challenger and an incumbent. Moreover, in the model of citizen-candidate
equilibrium, the “citizen candidates” cannot commit to any policy but their
own ideal policy: there are essentially no parties in that model. Thus, in
multi-dimensional party competition games with simultaneous moves, it is
still important to investigate another solution for the non-existence of pure
strategy equilibrium.
It is Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001) who proposed a new equilibrium con-
cept, known as party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) for these politi-
cal games. This is where the notion of a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous
move game between the parties is retained, but their preferences are re-
placed with incomplete preferences: put diﬀerently, each party’s preference
is a quasi-ordering. The model introduces the idea that the decision makers
in parties have diﬀerent interests. In this approach, the activists in each
party are divided into one of three factions:t h eOpportunist,t h eMilitant,
and the Reformist. The Opportunist is solely concerned with winning oﬃce,
the Militant is only concerned with publicizing the party’s view, and the Re-
formist is concerned with the expected welfare of the party’s members. Given
2the structure of the three factions within a party, how then does the party
make policy decisions in the electoral context? Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001)
proposed the following scenario. The three factions of each party should bar-
gain on the policy proposal, given a policy proposal by its opponent party,
a n di fap o l i c yp r o p o s a la g r e e do ni nt h i sp a r t yi sP a r e t oe ﬃcient for the three
factions, this is the solution for the bargaining problem within the party. A
PUNE is then a pair of policy proposals, each component of which is the
result of intra-party bargaining when facing the other party’s proposal.12
In this paper, we consider a general existence problem of PUNEsi n
multi-dimensional political competition games. It is worth noting that there
are a few studies, such as Roemer (1998; 1999) and Yoshihara (2008), that
show the existence of PUNEsi ns o m es p e c i ﬁc types of multi-dimensional
political games. Moreover, Roemer (2001: Section 13.7) discussed the ex-
istence of PUNEs in general multi-dimensional political games. However,
this existence theorem refers only to a speciﬁct y p eo fPUNE in which the
Militants are assumed to have dictatorial powers in both parties. It is easy
to see the general existence of this sort of PUNE, because the pair of Mil-
itants’ ideal policies of both parties constitutes a PUNE (which we call an
M-PUNE below).
Thus, we still have the following open question concerning the general ex-
istence of PUNEs: If the Militants of both parties are not assumed to have
dictatorial powers, under what general conditions is the existence of PUNEs
guaranteed? This problem is worth investigating, because this premise ap-
p e a r st ob em o r en a t u r a la n dg e n e r a la sf a ra sr e a lp o l i t i c si sc o n c e r n e d .
A tt h es a m et i m e ,h o w e v e r ,t h ep r e m i s em a k e st h ep r o b l e mm o r ed i ﬃcult.3
1A possible criticism against the notion of PUNE would be the following one: the con-
dition that every Pareto eﬃcient outcome with respect to the factions within a party could
be an equilibrium strategy is not persuasive: a better approach would be to determine
relative bargaining powers endogenously in a non-cooperative bargaining framework, so
that an appropriate Pareto eﬃcient outcome within the party is selected as an equilibrium
strategy. That approach, however, should be more diﬃcult to guarantee the existence of
equilibrium than the case of the Wittman model. Note that the Wittman equilibrium is a
reﬁnement of PUNE, in which the relative bargaining power is exogenously given as the
symmetric one.
2Another justiﬁcation for PUNE is that there are a number of applications, as in
Roemer and Silvestre (2002) and in Roemer, Lee, and Van der Straeten (2007), in which
PUNEs are computed with real data, and those computations suggest that the PUNE
model can well explain real politics. For detail, see Roemer (2004).
3In fact, Roemer (2001; Section 13.7, pp. 277-279) also wrote: “is there an interesting
3One reason is that, proving the existence of a PUNE is not enough, be-
cause we already know, as discussed above, that an M-PUNE exists. So, we
need to construct an argument which proves the existence of another PUNE
(which we will call C-PUNE below) besides the M-PUNE. The second rea-
son is that we cannot adopt the strategy of ﬁnding a suﬃcient condition
of the model parameters to straightforwardly apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem. This is because if the Militants of both parties are not dictators,
then each party’s best response strategy should be a compromise among
the factions, particularly reﬂecting the Opportunists’ objectives. However,
the objective function of the Opportunist–the probability of winning the
election–is neither generally continuous nor quasi-concave.4
In this paper, we provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of C-
PUNEs. In this existence problem, we apply the Urai-Hayashi ﬁxed point
theorem [ U r a ia n dH a y a s h i( 2 0 0 0 ) ] ,a si td oes not require the convex val-
uedness of correspondences. The suﬃcient condition contains the following:
Each party’s preference is represented by a continuous and strictly quasi-
concave function, and aggregate uncertainty over voters’ behavior is suﬃ-
ciently large. Such a condition appears natural and would be satisﬁed in
many political environments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes a basic model of
multi-dimensional political games, and introduces the PUNE and its re-
ﬁnements (M-PUNE and C-PUNE). Section 3 discusses the existence of
C-PUNEs. Finally, section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2M o d e l
Let the continuum of voter types be H ⊆ Rk, the policy space be T ⊆ Rn,
a continuous probability measure of voter types in the polity be F on H,
and the utility function of type h ∈ H over policies be v(·,h).L e t v(·,h)
be a non-negative real valued function, which is continuous, concave, and
general existence theorem for party-unanimity Nash equilibrium? I conjecture there is not.
··· What we really desire is a theorem asserting the existence of a PUNE in which no
faction is at its ideal point. But that appears to be hard to come by. ···It is probably very
diﬃcult to ﬁnd interesting suﬃcient conditions for the existence of (non-trivial) PUNEs.”
4This is a problem similar to the existence of Wittman equilibrium. There are two ex-
istence theorems of Wittman equilibrium in uni-dimensional policy spaces, Roemer (1997)
and Terai (2006), but both of them depend upon unsatisfactory speciﬁc assumptions for
the distribution of voter types.
4strictly quasi-concave on T, for any h ∈ H.L e t (t1,t 2) ∈ T × T be a pair
of policies. The set of voters who prefer t1 to t2 is denoted by Ω(t1,t 2) ≡
{h ∈ H | v(t1,h) >v (t2,h)}.N o w ,w ei m p o s et h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n :
Assumption 1 (A1): The measure F is equivalent to Lebesgue measure on
H.
Assumption 2 (A2): For any t,t0 ∈ T with t 6= t0, the set of voters who
are indiﬀerent between t and t0 is of F-measure zero.
Following Roemer (2001: Section 2.3; 2005), the fraction of the vote
going to policy t1 would be F(Ω(t1,t 2)). We also assume that there is some
aggregate uncertainty in how people will vote, so that the probability of
victory depends on the fraction of the vote, and on a noise parameter ε


















2 ∈ (F(Ω(t1,t 2)) − β,F(Ω(t1,t 2)) + β)
1 if F(Ω(t1,t 2)) − β ≥ 1
2
,
whenever t1 6= t2,a n dπ(t1,t 2)=1
2 whenever t1 = t2. Then, one political
environment is speciﬁed by a tuple hH,F,T,v,βi.
Let us suppose that exactly two parties will form. The two parties will
each represent a coalition of voter types such that A∪B ⊆ H and A∩B = ∅.
Moreover, we deﬁne the parties’ utility functions on T by V A : T → R and














where 0 <a<1 and 0 <b<1.
We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium notion of this multi-dimensional
political competition game, party-unanimity Nash equilibria (PUNEs), as
introduced by Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001).
Deﬁnition 1: Given a pair of parties, A and B,ap a i ro fp o l i c i e s(tA,t B) ∈
T × T constitutes a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) if :
(tA,t B) satisﬁes the following:







A), with at least one strict inequality;







B), with at least one strict inequality.
In Deﬁnition 1, condition (a) states that, facing the opponent’s proposal tB,
there is no policy in T that can improve the payoﬀso fa l lt h r e ef a c t i o n si n
party A, and condition (b) makes an analogous statement for the factions of
party B. Note that in this deﬁnition, there is no statement for the Reformists’
payoﬀs, because (a) and (b) describe the conditions for the Opportunists’
payoﬀs, π(·,·) and 1 − π(·,·), and the Militants’ payoﬀs, V A(·) and V B(·),
only. However, as Roemer (2001: Chapter 8; Theorem 8.1(3)) showed, the
equilibrium set corresponding to this simpler deﬁnition of PUNE is equiv-
alent to that of the original deﬁnition of PUNE g i v e ni nR o e m e r( 2 0 0 1 :
Chapter 8; Deﬁnition 8.1).
This general deﬁnition admits the case in which tA = tB. To eliminate
such a case, let us deﬁne the following: given a pair of parties, A and B,
a pair of policies (tA,t B) ∈ T × T is called a non-trivial PUNE if it is a
PUNE such that tA 6= tB.
Among the various PUNEs, a polar case is where both parties only care
about satisfying their own preferences, such that both parties never care
about their probability of winning an election. In other words, the Militants
are assumed to be dictators in both parties. Such a speciﬁc PUNE is given
by the following:
Deﬁnition 2: Given a pair of parties, A and B,ap a i ro fp o l i c i e s(tA,t B) ∈
T ×T is a Militant-dictatorial PUNE (M-PUNE) if this is a PUNE such
that tA =a r gm a x
t∈T




A ≡ arg max
t∈T
V A(t) and t
B ≡ arg max
t∈T
V B(t).W .l .o .g . ,w ea s s u m e
that t
A 6= t
B throughout the following discussion.
Finally, the most realistic and interesting type of PUNE is the case
where both parties oﬀer diﬀerent policies, and where no faction in either
party is assumed to have a dictatorial power. Such a PUNE is given by the
following:
6Deﬁnition 3: Given a pair of parties, A and B,ap a i ro fp o l i c i e s(tA,t B) ∈
T × T is a pure-compromise PUNE (C-PUNE) if this is a PUNE with
(i) tA 6= tB, (ii) tA 6= t
A, and (iii) tB 6= t
B.
This deﬁnition assumes the existence of a real inter-faction bargaining process
within each party, so that the Opportunists in each party have a chance to
inﬂuence the party’s decision making.
3 Existence Theorem for C-PUNE
In the following discussion, we provide a rather general and reasonable con-
dition under which the existence of C-PUNEs is shown in multi-dimensional
political competition games. Note that, if the two parties’ utility functions







As the ﬁrst preliminary step, let us introduce a generalization of the
Kakutani ﬁx e dp o i n tt h e o r e m ,w h i c hw a sﬁrst discussed by Urai and Hayashi
(2000), and is useful where the correspondence is nonconvex-valued.
Lemma 1 (Urai and Hayashi ﬁxed point theorem: Urai and Hayashi
(2000)):5 Consider, for each player i ∈ N = {1,...,n}, the set Xi is a
compact convex subset of Rl. Suppose that there is a family of non-empty
valued correspondences φi : X ³ Xi, where i ∈ N and X ≡
Q
j∈N Xj,
satisfying the following condition:
(LDV1) For each x ∈ X such that x/ ∈
Q
j∈N φj(x), there exist a player i,
av e c t o rpi(x) ∈ Rl a n da no p e nn e i g h b o r h o o dN(x) of x such that pi(x) ·
(wi − zi) > 0 for all z ∈ N(x) and wi ∈ φi(z).
Then,
Q
j∈N φj has a ﬁxed point x∗ ∈ X such that x∗
i ∈ φi(x∗) for all i ∈ N.
Note that in the Urai and Hayashi ﬁxed point theorem, the correspondence Q
j∈N φj need not be convex-valued nor upper hemi-continuous. In the exis-
tence problems of our PUNE discussed below, the best response correspon-
dence will not be necessarily convex-valued. Thus, Lemma 1 will play a
crucial role.
5The original statement of the Urai-Hayashi ﬁxed point is more general than this ver-
sion: the domain of the correspondence need not be the product space as here. To discuss
our own issue, however, a simplier version as this lemma is suﬃcient.
7As the second preliminary step, let us introduce the following equilibrium
notion:
Deﬁnition 1’: Given a pair of parties, A and B, a pair of policies (tA,t B) ∈
T × T constitutes a quasi-PUNE (q-PUNE) if :
(1) (tA,t B) satisﬁes the following:















A), with at least one strict inequality;















B), with at least one strict inequality.
Deﬁnition 3’: Given a pair of parties, A and B, a pair of policies (tA,t B) ∈
T × T constitutes a quasi-C-PUNE (q-C-PUNE) if it is a q-PUNE with
(i) tA 6= tB,( ii) tA 6= t
A, and (iii) tB 6= t
B.
The notion of q-PUNE has another interesting implication regarding the
real political competition. The diﬀerence of q-PUNE from PUNE is that
the Opportunists are modeled to maximize vote share instead of maximizing
the probability of victory. So, this notion can be relevant to a Proportional
representation system.
In the following discussion, we will ﬁrst show an existence theorem of
q-C-PUNE, as a corollary of which, an existence theorem of C-PUNE will
be discussed later. First, we impose the following additional assumptions:
Assumption 3 (A3): For any tB ∈ T, there exists t0 ∈ T such that Ω(t0,t B)




> 0. Also, for any tA ∈ T, there exists t00 ∈ T





A3 eliminates a situation that party B (resp. A) has a dominant strategy in
terms of its opportunist objective. In fact, if A3 fails, it implies that party
B (resp. A) has a policy by which the party wins the election with certainty
regardless of what strategy party A (resp. B)e m p l o y s . I ns u c hat y p eo f
game, there may exist only the trivial PUNE (tA,t B) with tA = tB other
than M-PUNE.
Given ε > 0 and ti ∈ T for i = A,B,l e tUi (ti,ε) ≡ {t ∈ T | 0 5 V i(ti) − V i(t) 5 ε}.
Let us use the notation coX as the convex hull of X for any set X. Then:




























), and any t ∈ co{t0A,t B} with t 6= t0A,t B (resp. t ∈




















A4 is reasonable, if every voter’s utility function is concave. In fact, for
any t,t0 ∈ T and any t00 ∈ co{t,t0} with t00 6= t and t00 6= t0, it follows that
Ω(t,t0) ⊆ Ω(t00,t 0),s i n c ea n yh ∈ Ω(t,t0) has v(t,h) >v (t0,h),a n da l s o
v(t00,h) >v (t0,h) by the concavity of v. In addition to this property, there
may be another type of voter h0 ∈ H\Ω(t,t0) such that v(t,h0) <v (t0,h 0)
and v(t00,h 0) >v (t0,h 0). Note that these two inequalities are compatible











,t h ev o t e r ss u c ha sh0 exist in H\Ω(t,t0), and the measure
of such voters is non-negligible. In other words, A4 requires a variety of
voter types. This assumption eliminates a trivial case that t
A is the best
strategy against t
B or another t0B, not only for the Militant, but also for the
Opportunist of party A. In fact, if such a trivial case holds in some political




with tA = t
A
besides the trivial PUNE (tA,t B) with tA = tB in this game.

























Note that UA(tA) (resp. UB(tB))i sc o n v e x . L e tu sd e ﬁne a mapping F :





.G i v e n
(tA,t B) ∈ T × T, the collection of t0A ∈ T such that F(t0A,t B)=F(tA,t B)
constitutes the iso-fraction curve of F(·,t B) at tA. Then, the last assumption
requires a kind of ‘local quasi-concavity’ of F.






ists suﬃciently small ε∗
A > 0 (resp. ε∗

























), there is a suﬃciently small neighborhood of tA
(resp. tB), on which F(·,t B) is quasi-concave (resp. 1 − F(tA,·) is quasi-
concave).
This assumption also seems reasonable. This is because, though the function
F(·,t B) is not globally quasi-concave in general, it seems reasonable to assume
that it is locally quasi-concave if the ‘locality’ is taken as a suﬃciently small
subset of the domain.6 I nf a c t ,a sw ea r g u eb e l o w ,i fF(·,t B) is diﬀerentiable
at each tA ∈ T\
©
tBª
,a n de a c hV i is also diﬀerentiable and its Hessian
matrix is non-singular, A5 is supported.7 Then, if parties’ utility functions






is a suﬃciently small, strict













, there is a unique point t0A ∈ UA(tA) at which the iso-
fraction curve of F(·,t B) is tangent to UA(tA). The same argument is also
applied to 1 − F(tA,·).
Then:
Theorem 1: Suppose T is a compact and convex subset in Rn,a n de a c h
party’s utility function V i, where i ∈ {A,B}, is continuous and strictly quasi-
concave on T. Let A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 hold. Then, there exists a






∈ T × T with t
A 6= t
B, we can appropriately choose





with tA∗ 6= tB∗ such that UA(tA∗)∩UB(tB∗)=
∅.N o t e t h a t t
A ∈ UA(tA∗) and t
B ∈ UB(tB∗). Note that for any pair
(tA,t B) ∈ UA(tA∗) × UB(tB∗), tA 6= tB holds. For each i = A,B,l e t
Ui(ti;t










is given by A4. Then,




have the following property:
6In fact, all of the works on PUNEs by John Roemer and others have implicitly used
this assumption.
7Note that the diﬀerentiability of F(·,t B) is not so strong an assumption, since F is
equivalent to the Lebesgue measure by A1.






























Denote the set of such t0A by GA ¡
tA,t B¢
. In the same way, denote the
set of such t0B by GB ¡
tA,t B¢








holds for each i = A,B. This implies that Ui(ti;t
i,εi)
is continuous at each ti ∈ T for each i = A,B.S i n c eF is continuous at each




on UA(tA∗) × UB(tB∗),b yB e r g e ’ sm a x i m u mt h e o r e m .
Let intX (resp. ∂X)b et h einterior (resp. boundary)o ft h es e tX.
Deﬁne a correspondence ϕA : UA(tA∗) × UB(tB∗) ³ UA(tA∗) as follows:
for each (tA,t B) ∈ UA(tA∗)×UB(tB∗), ϕA(tA,t B)=GA ¡
tA,t B¢
.A l s o ,d e ﬁne
ϕB : UA(tA∗)×UB(tB∗) ³ UB(tB∗) as: for each (tA,t B) ∈ UA(tA∗)×UB(tB∗),
ϕB(tA,t B)=GB ¡
tA,t B¢
.F i n a l l y , l e t ϕ ≡ ϕA × ϕB. It is clear that
ϕ(tA,t B) 6= ∅ for every (tA,t B) ∈ UA(tA∗) × UB(tB∗).
We show below that ϕ also satisﬁes LDV1 of Lemma 1.L e t(tA,t B) / ∈




















Insert Figure 1 around here.
By LDV1,i ts u ﬃces to discuss the case of tA / ∈ ϕA(tA,t B).S u p p o s e t h a t
















A,εA). Moreover, since UA(tA;t
A,εA) is strictly





holds. This implies that, by the separating hyperplane the-
orem, there exists pA
¡
tA¢






> 0 holds for




Insert Figure 2 around here.




of ϕA(tA,t B),w h i c hi ss m a l l













Since ϕA is upper hemi-continuous at (tA,t B), thereisaneighborhoodN(tA,t B)








for any (t0A,t 0B) ∈ N(tA,t B).C o n s i d e rN(tA,t B) ( N(tA,t B),w h i c hi ss m a l l
enough, so that for any
¡
tA0,t B0¢

















,w ec a nﬁnd such





(t0A,t 0B) ∈ N(tA,t B).




and N(tA,t B), we can see that for
























.T h e n ,UA(tA;t






Note that for a given tB, GA ¡
tA,t B¢
















Also, by A4,f o ra n yt0A ∈ GA ¡
tA,t B¢
and any t ∈ co
©
t0A,t Bª













.M o r e o v e r , w e
can assume by A5 and the strong quasi-concavity of V A that GA(tA,t B)=
©
e tAª





,t h e n





































e tA − t0A¢
> 0 holds for any t0A ∈ N(tA). Moreover, for a suﬃciently
small neighborhood N(tB) of tB,f o ra n yt0B ∈ N(tB), GA(tA,t 0B) is also




= ϕA(tA,t 0B). Then, by the upper hemi-continuity of GA,w ec a n
s e et h a t ,f o rs o m es u ﬃciently small neighborhood N(tA,t B) ≡ N(tA)×N(tB)





e t0A − t0A¢
> 0 holds for any (t0A,t 0B) ∈ N(tA,t B).
In summary, ϕ satisﬁes LDV1 of Lemma 1. Thus, by Lemma 1, ϕ has
12a ﬁxed point (b tA,b tB) ∈ ϕ(b tA,b tB). By the deﬁnition of ϕ, b tA 6= b tB holds.



















































is a q-PUNE with b tA = t
A or b tB = t
B.L e t
b tA = t




























by A4, which is a contradiction. The same
argument is applied to b tB = t
B.T h u s , t h e a b o v e ﬁxed point (b tA,b tB) has
b tA 6= t
A and b tB 6= t
B.T h i si m p l i e st h a t(b tA,b tB) is a q-C-PUNE.
Corollary 1: Suppose T is a compact and convex subset in Rn,a n de a c h
party’s utility function V i, where i ∈ {A,B}, is continuous and strictly quasi-





be close enough to 1
2, and let
A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 hold. Then, there exists a C-PUNE for the
environment hH,F,T,v,βi.
Proof. By Theorem 1,t h e r ee x i s t saq -C-PUNE (b tA,b tB).L e t u s t a k e





,w h i c hi ss u ﬃciently close to 1

















+ β holds. Then,
by the deﬁnition, 0 < π
¡
b tA,b tB¢
< 1 holds, so that (b tA,b tB) is a C-PUNE for
hH,F,T,v,βi.




is a PUNE, it implies that, under the assumption that V A,








⎝ V A ¡
tA¢
− V A ¡
tB¢























⎝ V B ¡
tB¢











































for i = A,B.T h a ti s ,t h ea b o v e2 × n equations (5) and (6) with
¡
αA,αB¢
constitute the necessary condition for (tA,t B) to be a PUNE.N o t et h a t
















= 0.( 6 a )





























































































6=0 , then by the implicit function theorem,
































is non-singular, there will


















of the equations (5a) and (6a). The solutions do not necessarily constitute
PUNEs, but they are at least ‘local’ PUNEs, since (5a) and (6a) constitute
the necessary condition of PUNE, but not the suﬃcient condition.









is guaranteed. We have the following:
14Proposition 1: Suppose T is a compact and convex subset in Rn,a n de a c h
party’s utility function V i, where i ∈ {A,B}, is continuously diﬀerentiable
and strictly quasi-concave on T. Let A1, A2, A3, and A4 hold. Let F be



































of the Hessian matrix of V i (ti) evaluated at t









6=0holds when V i is strictly concave. For











=0for any j,k =








6=0for both i = A,B.S u c ha
condition is satisﬁed if every party’s utility function is separable and strictly
concave. In most concrete examples of political competition games, parties’
utility functions have these properties, such as quasi-linear utility function
or Euclidean preference. Thus, the suﬃcient condition of Proposition 1 is
reasonable.
Proposition 1 also indicates that, if V A, V B,a n dF are diﬀerentiable,
and the Hessian matrices of V A and V B are non-singular, then A5 can be











, which implies that F should be at least lo-











, the implicit function theorem can be applied to the
equation (5), so that the solution tA ¡
αA¢
of (5) is uniquely determined within
a neighborhood of t
A. These arguments imply that A5 holds. Thus:
Corollary 2: Suppose T is a compact and convex subset in Rn,a n de a c h
party’s utility function V i, where i ∈ {A,B}, is continuously diﬀerentiable
















6=0for i = A,B. Then, there exists a C-PUNE for
the environment hH,F,T,v,βi.
15Note that the combination of A1, A2, A3, A4,a n dA5 with β close
enough to 1
2 is nonvacuous, and the condition, β close enough to 1
2,i si n -
dispensable for the existence of C-PUNE. Note also, though Berinsky and
Lewis (2007) empirically found that voters’ utility functions are close to lin-
ear rather than strictly concave, Corollary 1 relies not on strict concavity,
but only on strict quasi-concavity of parties’ utility functions.
To illustrate the above ﬁrst point, for instance, consider the Euclidean
model with a two-dimensional policy space given by Roemer (2001: Section
8.7), where the two-dimensional policy space is a disc and the probability
distribution deﬁned on the disc is the uniform distribution. We can see
that, in this model, A1, A2, A3, A4,a n dA5 with β close enough to 1
2
are satisﬁed, so that a C-PUNE exists. There is yet another example of
multi-dimensional political games, which meets A1, A2, A3, A4,a n dA5
with β close enough to 1
2. This model is based on Roemer (1998), though
the modeling of uncertainty diﬀers from Roemer (1998), which is given as
follows:
Example 1: Consider a political environment hH,F,T,v,βi such that H =
{(w,a) ∈ W ×A|W ≡ [w,w] (R + & A ≡ [a,a] (R },w h e r eW is the set
of income levels, and A is the set of religious views, T = {(τ,z) | τ ∈ [0,1] and z ∈ A},
where τ is a uniform tax rate on income, and z is a religious position of the
government, and v(τ,z;w,a)=( 1− γ)[(1− τ)w + τμ] −
γ
2 (z − a)
2,w h e r e
μ i st h em e a ni n c o m eo ft h i ss o c i e t y .M o r e o v e r ,F has its associated density





is strictly increasing at every a0 ∈ A.F i n a l l y , F is assumed to satisfy A1
and A2,a n dβ is close enough to 1
2.
Note that for any h ∈ H, if his or her income wh > μ,t h e nτ =0is the
ideal tax rate for him or her, whereas if wh ≤ μ,t h e nτ =1is the ideal tax
rate for him or her. Let A ≡ {h ∈ H | wh ≤ μ} and B ≡ {h ∈ H | wh > μ}.
Let aA be the ideal religious view of A and aB be the median ideal view of
B.M o r e o v e r ,l e taH be the median religious view over H. Assume aA 6= aB.






be a non-trivial M-PUNE
for each γ ∈ [0,1].
If γ =1 , then a non-trivial M-PUNE for γ =1implies zA (1) 6= zB (1).
Thus, if γ < 1 is close to one, then zA (γ) 6= zB (γ) holds. Then, for such





there are some voters whose ideal religious policies are identical to a,a n d
16the F-measure of those voters is positive. The last condition follows from the
strictly increasing b F (a0). Note in the case where γ < 1 is suﬃciently close to
one, the eﬀect of the tax policy τ on the voters’ welfare is negligible relative
to that of the religious policy z. Finally, since each party’s utility function is




2 (z − ai)






is diﬀerentiable by assumption, A5 also holds.
Thus, Corollary 2 tells us that there exists a C-PUNE. In fact, for








(0,a A) and t






=( ( 0 ,b zA),(0,b zB))
such that aA < b zA <a H < b zB <a B with
b zA+b zB
2 = aH.T h i sp r o ﬁle constitutes
aC - PUNE when β is close enough to 1
2. Moreover, assume that the mean
income of the cohort of voters with the median religious view aH is higher
than the mean income, μ, of the population. Then, for any γ < 1 close
enough to one, any proﬁle
¡




b tA (1),b tB (1)
¢
still constitutes
aC - PUNE when β is close enough to 1
2.
To see that the condition, β close enough to 1
2, is indispensable for the
existence of C-PUNE, let us consider the following example of political
games in which there only exist one non-trivial M-PUNE and one trivial
PUNE under β close enough to 0:
Example 2: Consider a political environment hH,F,T,v,βi such that H =
W ≡ [w,w] (R ++,w h e r eW is the set of income levels, T = {(τ,α) | τ ∈
[0,1] and α ∈ [0,1]},w h e r eτ is a uniform tax rate on income, and α is the
ratio of public good expenditure over tax revenue, and the citizen w’s utility
function is:






where μ is the mean income of this society. In this environment, if the society
chooses (τ,α), then its tax revenue is τμ per capita, and its public good
expenditure becomes ατμ per capita. Then, (1 − α)τμ is the subsidy that
every citizen receives through the income redistribution policy. Thus, the
choice of (τ,α) implies the choice of redistribution and public good provision
in this society. In every citizen’s utility function v,t h et e r m(1 − τ)w +
17(1 − α)τμrepresents the citizen w’s after-tax income when the policy (τ,α) is




σ(ατμ) represents the citizen w’s beneﬁt
from the public good provision. Assume that lim
λ→0
∂σ(λμ)
∂λμ =+ ∞,a n df o r
some λ∗ ∈ (0,1),
∂σ(λ∗μ)
∂λ∗μ =1 . Finally, F is assumed to satisfy A1 and A2,
which is characterized by a density function f (w) over W.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
Ω(tA,t B)={w ∈ W | v(τA,αA;w) − v(τB,αB;w) > 0}, it is easy to see that
F satisﬁes A3.L e t F be a cumulative distribution function on W.I t i s
assumed that F(μ) > 1
2.
Note that there exists h∗ ∈ H with wh∗ > μ such that A = {h ∈ H | wh <w h∗}
and B = {h ∈ H | wh ≥ wh∗} with wB =
R
h∈B whdF(h) > μ,s ot h a twA = R
h∈A whdF(h) < μ. It is assumed that F(wA)=1
2. Then, by means of the as-
sumptions on
∂σ(λμ)
∂λμ and the facts that wA < μ <w B,t h e r ee x i s tα∗ ∈ (0,1)













α∗ > τ∗ holds. We can see that (1,α∗) is the ideal policy for party A,w h i l e
(τ∗,1) is the ideal policy for party B.
Given this setting, if β is close enough to 1












∂ατμ > 1 constitutes a C-PUNE with







holds for the pair of ideal policies
¡
tA,t B¢
= ((1,α∗),(τ∗,1)).T h u s ,i fβ is











Before ending this section, it is worthwhile to point out the following two
remarks: First, one may well wonder if the method using Urai-Hayashi ﬁxed
point theorem could also be applied to the existence problem of Wittman
equilibrium in multi-dimensional political games with uncertainty. For in-
stance, let us consider the problems (1) and (2) with the weights αA = 1
2 =
αB, and then apply the Urai-Hayashi ﬁxed point theorem as in the proof of
Theorem 1. Though this method seems to be useful for the existence prob-
lem of Wittman equilibrium, the resulting ﬁxed point is not necessarily a
Wittman equilibrium, but deﬁnitely a PUNE.T h i si sb e c a u s es u c haﬁxed
point is a pair of the solutions for the constrained Nash bargaining prob-
lems subject to the upper contour sets of themselves, whereas any Wittman
equilibrium should be a pair of the solutions for the non-constrained Nash
bargaining problems.
Second, though we have focussed on C-PUNE,t h e r em i g h tw e l lb ea n -
18other interesting reﬁnement of PUNE:t h a ti s ,PUNE with endogenous
party formations. Though there may be various possible ways to formulate
it, one way was proposed by Roemer (2005, p.225), in which it is given by a
well-known condition of endogenous party formations [Baron (1993); Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1997); Gomberg (2004); Gomberg et al. (2004)], in addition to
Deﬁnition 1 of this paper. The condition requires that the voting partition
resulting from a proﬁle of policy proposals is identical in equilibrium to the
membership partition inducing this pair of policy proposals. There are two
comments on this speciﬁct y p eo fPUNE. First, showing even the general ex-
istence of M-PUNE is quite diﬃcult in the endogenous party models. Note
that M-PUNE with the endogenous party formations is a speciﬁct y p eo f
sorting equilibrium [Gomberg (2004)], and, as has been discussed by Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1997), Gomberg (2004), and Gomberg et al. (2004), the general
existence of such an equilibrium is faced with diﬃculty when the dimension
of policy space is even.8 Second, in the context of endogenous parties, it
seems hard to give a natural interpretation to Militant (and also Reformist)
factions. In this context, Militants advocate the average platform, integrated
over the space of voters who prefer this party to another, but one may won-
d e rw h a tk i n do fp e o p l ei nr e a ll i f eu n c ompromisingly adhere to a platform
that often frivolously changes with the decisions of other voters. Of course,
Militants may understand that the party is an instrument for representing
its members. However, in the above endogenous party models, the left-wing
party (or its Militant) may possibly propose a more right-wing policy than
the opponent if it happens to collect right-wing citizens as its membership.
This paradoxical phenomenon is due to a lack of argument on preserving
party members’ loyalty in determining their platforms: the bureaucracy of
the left-wing party would propose a more left-wing policy than the opposing
party so as to preserve the loyalty of all left-wing members. Roemer (2005,
p.226) proposed an alternative formulation of PUNE in endogenous party
models with this extra consideration,9 and the general existence of such an
equilibrium can be obtained by modifying the proof method of this paper’s
Theorem 1, as discussed in Yoshihara (2008a).
8Though, as Gomberg, et. al (2004) showed, this does not necessarily imply that
the existence of sorting equilibrium is impossible in any political game with the even
dimensionality of policy space.
9Roemer (2005) called this quasi-PUNE.
194C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we introduced, in general multi-dimensional political games,
ar e ﬁnement of PUNEs, C-PUNEs ,a n dp r o v i d e ds u ﬃcient conditions for
the existence of C-PUNEs. The suﬃcient conditions appear natural and
plausible, and this implies that there are many reasonable models of multi-
dimensional political games in which this reﬁnement exists.
In this paper, we focussed on a speciﬁc modeling of party uncertainty,
which Roemer (2001: Chapter 2) called the Error-Distribution Model of Un-
certainty. However, Roemer (2001: Chapter 2) also proposed other types
of uncertainty models. We have not considered the existence problems in
alternative uncertainty models.
The existence theorems in this paper depend on the assumption of strictly
quasi-concave utility functions. However, there are some examples of political
games with only weakly quasi-concave utility functions, such as set out by
Roemer (1999). The existence of the reﬁned PUNEs in political games with
only weakly quasi-concave utility functions remains an open question.
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